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Resumen
Este artículo muestra  cómo los acuerdos regionales de comercio (ARC) pueden generar una
expansión de la inversión extranjera directa y efectos redistributivos. Estos dos efectos, a su vez,
afectan la formación endógena de los ARC. La inversión aumenta a consecuencia de la capacidad de
las firmas extranjeras de atender un mercado más grande desde una única instalación. El efecto de
redistribución ocurre por el deseo de las firmas de trasladar sus plantas originales desde países de alto
costo a otros más convenientes. La industria automotriz en el Mercosur es un excelente  ejemplo para
estudiar estos fenómenos. Argentina temía que Brasil —con bajos costos— atrajera toda la inversión
extranjera y dominara ambos mercados. Para convencer a Argentina que aceptara firmar un tratado de
libre comercio en automóviles (y con Mercosur), el acuerdo sectorial incluyó la una cláusula
comercial compensatoria, que exige a cada firma equilibrar su comercio entre estos países. Así se
mitigaría el problema de la redistribución, pues obliga a las firmas a producir algunos modelos en
Argentina y alienta a los gobiernos a firmar el ARC.
Abstract
This paper demonstrates how regional trade agreements (RTAs) can lead to both foreign direct
investment expansion and relocation effects. These two effects, in return, impact the endogenous
formation of RTAs. The investment expansion effect results from foreign firms’ ability to serve a
larger market from a single facility. The relocation effect occurs due to the firms’ desire to move their
initial plants from high-cost member countries to low-cost ones. The relocation effect can overwhelm
the expansion effect for the high-cost members and lead to the collapse of socially efficient RTAs. The
auto industry in Mercosur is a great example to study these phenomena. Argentina was worried that
low-cost Brazil would attract all of the foreign investment and dominate both markets. To convince
Argentina to agree to free trade in automobiles (and to Mercosur), the auto sectoral agreement
included the Compensated Trade Clause (CTC) which requires each firm to balance its trade between
these countries. This mitigates the relocation problem by forcing firms to produce some models in
Argentina and entices the governments to sign the RTA.
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Academic debate over the eﬀects of the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has
mostly focused on the trade diversion vs. trade creation question1. However, a close inspection of
the actual formation process of various RTAs reveals that member countries are equally concerned
about the impact on the investment ﬂows. There is widespread evidence that smaller and poorer
countries (such as Eastern European or Latin American countries) want to join wealthier groups
(such as the EU or the NAFTA) or form regional unions (such as Mercosur) in order to attract
more foreign direct investment. The main reason is that foreign ﬁrms are more likely to invest in
ac o u n t r yt h a ti sam e m b e ro faR T As i n c et h e yc a ns e r v eal a r g e rm a r k e tf r o mas i n g l ef a c i l i t y
and save on the ﬁxed costs of operating a plant. The investment expansion eﬀect improves the
w e l f a r eo ft h em e m b e rc o u n t r i e sa saw h o l ea n dc r e a t e sas i g n i ﬁcant motive to form RTAs. This is
indeed among the main features of what Ethier [1998] identiﬁes as “New Regionalism”a n d“ Deep
Integration” paradigms.
Formation or enlargement of RTAs, at the same time, can divert part of the initial foreign
investment from some member countries to others. Foreign ﬁrms can relocate their regional pro-
duction away from countries with high production costs and serve the integrated market from their
plants in the low-cost countries. This investment relocation eﬀect can be quite signiﬁcant for the
high-cost countries and leave them worse oﬀ under the RTA compared to a unilateral trade pol-
icy. Therefore cost asymmetries among member countries leave RTAs vulnerable to defection by
high-cost countries and may cause their failure even when the net gain for the region is positive.
The auto industry in Mercosur is a great example to study the phenomena mentioned above.
During Mercosur negotiations, Argentina was quite concerned that low-cost Brazil would attract all
of the current auto producers2 as well as new entrants who would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest in the
region. The sectoral negotiations in automobiles involved numerous impasses over the years and had
to be salvaged by the presidents of Argentina and Brazil on several occasions. The two governments
resolved the investment relocation problem through an ingenious mechanism called “Compensated
Trade Clause” (CTC)3 a n ds i g n e dt h eﬁnal sectoral agreement called “Politica Automotriz del
Mercosur” (Automotive Policy of Mercosur - PAM) on March 24, 2000. The CTC requires that
1See Baldwin and Venables [1995] for an excellent survey.
2The auto industry in both countries was composed of foreign ﬁrms and their aﬃliates before Mercosur. This
continued to be the case after Mercosur.
3The CTC was included in the initial treaties (the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 and Ouro Preto Protocol in 1994)
that established Mercosur. PAM extended it until 2006. See next section for further details.
1each auto company should balance its bilateral auto trade between Argentina and Brazil. If a ﬁrm
fails to do so, its exports are subject to the regular tariﬀ rates. A balanced trade requirement forces
ﬁrms to invest and produce in both countries and prevents Brazil from dominating both markets
at the expense of Argentina. In other words, it mitigates the relocation problem while maintaining
the beneﬁts from investment expansion. Without the CTC, Argentina would never have agreed to
free trade in automobiles and probably would have abandoned Mercosur4.
More interestingly, it was the auto companies who suggested and lobbied extensively for this
restrictive rule. They would have naturally preferred to locate the production of all models and
varieties in Brazil but they were still able to take advantage of economies of scale by concentrating
all production of a model in one plant. Firms did exactly so by producing their luxury models in
Argentina and basic models in Brazil. In short, ﬁrms were aware that Mercosur with the CTC was a
better option than no Mercosur at all. It is also interesting to note that the CTC is enforced at the
ﬁrm level. This prevents the free-rider problem that arises when each ﬁrm desires its competitors
to invest in Argentina to save Mercosur for everyone’s beneﬁt. Thus the CTC not only helps the
governments to agree to regional free trade in automobiles but also increases the ﬁrms’ proﬁtability.
In this paper, our aim is two-fold. First, we introduce the simultaneous presence foreign direct
investment expansion and relocation eﬀects of RTAs through a theoretical model and demonstrate
how these two eﬀects endogenously determine the incentives to sign RTAs. More speciﬁcally, we
show that the relocation eﬀect can overwhelm the expansion eﬀect for high-cost countries and lead
t ot h ec o l l a p s eo ft h eR T A .S e c o n d ,w es h o wh o wt h eh a r m f u lr e l o c a t i o ne ﬀect was mitigated by
the CTC in Mercosur to realize the beneﬁcial expansion eﬀects.
Our theoretical model highlights the strategic interaction between governments and ﬁrms during
RTA negotiations. The model has four stages. First, two governments negotiate a customs union
(CU). If a CU is formed, then the ﬁrms decide on their investment levels, and which models to
produce and where in the second stage. In the third stage, the two governments determine a
common external tariﬀ given the investment decisions of the ﬁrms. In the fourth and ﬁnal stage,
the ﬁrms compete in a Cournot fashion in every model category and the payoﬀs are realized. If the
CU negotiations fail in the ﬁrst stage, then the ﬁrms make their investment decisions knowing that
there is going to be no intra-regional free trade. The governments choose their unilateral tariﬀs
4There are of course more eﬃcient mechanisms, such as direct transfers, that would convince Argentina to sign
the Mercosur. However these are politically diﬃcult to negotiate and implement since they would require transfers
between the auto ﬁrms, Brazil and Argentina. The compensated trade clause is attractive in terms of domestic
politics since it is based on “fair trade”, as the trade ministers of both countries remarked many times,
2and then the production takes place.
Both governments maximize a welfare function that takes into account the welfare of their
citizens and the number of cars produced within their borders (hence the incentive to attract
foreign ﬁrms.) All things being equal, ﬁrms prefer a customs union to serve both countries from
the same plants in order to take advantage of economies of scale (at the model level). We show that
a customs union between symmetric countries leads to higher overall investment into the region
in equilibrium because of this eﬀect. Both countries beneﬁt from this and therefore agree to the
customs union. However, if one country has lower production costs for all models, all ﬁrms want to
locate their plants there. We demonstrate that the other government never agrees to form a union
since it is better oﬀ by imposing unilateral tariﬀs. The resulting collapse of the CU makes all ﬁrms
worse oﬀ. Under such circumstances, ﬁrms support a balanced trade rule which requires them to
produce some models at the high-cost country. This alleviates the investment relocation eﬀect and
convinces the high-cost country to stay in the customs union. Hence the economically ineﬃcient
CTC becomes a political and strategic mechanism that entices the governments to form a customs
union by forcing the ﬁr m st oi n v e s ti nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .
Our political economy framework is in the same spirit of the “Quid Pro Quo” foreign investment
behavior of Bhagwati et.al. [1987, 1992] and Dinopoulos [1989] since the foreign investment decisions
a r eu n d e r t a k e ni na n t i c i p a t i o no f( a n dt oi n ﬂuence) future government actions. They are also
inﬂuenced by Grossman and Helpman’s [1994,1995] political economy framework for endogenous
policy determination where governments care about welfare and monetary contributions from lobby
groups. Grossman and Helpman [1996] look at how tariﬀs are determined endogenously in a single
country when there is the possibility of tariﬀ-jumping foreign investment. We modify this framework
so that governments care about the level of foreign investment and extend it to accommodate
customs union negotiations.
There are several papers which directly look at the impact of RTAs on foreign direct investment
ﬂows. Motta and Norman [1996] is an original and innovative paper that models the eﬀects of
regional integration on investment ﬂows in a three country, three ﬁrm setting with Cournot compe-
tition. They look at the changes in the investment strategies of these ﬁrms as two of the countries
get more integrated. They ﬁnd that regional integration (in most cases) increases the intra-region
production of the outside ﬁrm through rationalization of production, as it is the case in our model.
However, the investment relocation eﬀect cannot arise in their model due to the symmetries. Fur-
thermore, they do not model government behavior and, therefore, can not endogenize the customs
3union formation and tariﬀ determination process. In a related paper, Heinrich and Konan [2000]
analyze the impact of regional trade agreements on foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns in a
similar symmetric model. As do Motta and Norman [1996], they also show that integration leads
to rationalization by foreign ﬁrms and higher levels of regional production. They endogenize the
number of foreign ﬁrms that invest in the region and show that the impact of regional integration
is ambiguous since rationalization and easier access have opposing eﬀects. As with the previous
paper, the investment relocation and endogeneity issues are absent from their model. Ethier [1998]
emphasizes that small countries want to join regional blocs of developed countries to attract more
foreign investment, not necessarily to increase their bilateral trade. Though his main focus is on
the relationships between multilateralism and the “new regionalism,” his evidence and arguments
provide support for the motivation in our paper. There is a large literature on the impact of
regional integration on ﬁrms’ location decisions in the presence of agglomeration forces (such as
technological externalities). These “new growth” type of issues are beyond the scope of this paper
and are extensively surveyed in Baldwin and Venables [1995]. Finally, there are numerous papers
on multinational ﬁrms (within the new trade theory literature) mainly associated with Markusen,
Helpman and Ethier. Some of the main issues they analyze are strategic and technological issues
in markets in the presence of multinational ﬁrms. These are again beyond our scope and Markusen
[1995] provides a nice introduction to this voluminous literature.
There are numerous empirical studies looking at the linkage between regional integration and
total foreign direct investment. Blomstrom and Kokko [1997] study three regional agreements
and conclude that investment ﬂows depend on the overall advantages of the region. Beaulieu and
Hester [1999] ﬁnd that regional agreements in Latin America indirectly increased FDI by lowering
country-risk. However most of these studies use aggregate data and do not analyze the speciﬁc
sectoral and institutional arrangements. The most relevant empirical study is Baldwin, Forslid and
Haaland [1995] who analyze the investment expansion and relocation eﬀects of the EU’s Single
Market Programme (EU92). Through empirical evidence and simulations, they show that EU92
caused capital to be diverted from the EFTA countries to the EU and argue that the EU92 initiative
(partly due to the investment relocation) led several EFTA countries to join EU.
The next section analyzes the auto industry in Mercosur and the sectoral agrement. Section
III provides the main features of the analytical framework. Sections IV presents the unilateral
game between a government and the ﬁrms to determine the tariﬀ rate and the investment levels.
Section V introduces the customs union negotiations between symmetric countries and the invest-
4ment expansion eﬀect. Section VI presents the investment relocation eﬀect when the countries are
asymmetric and shows the signiﬁcance of the CTC. Section VII concludes the paper and oﬀers
directions for further research.
2 Mercosur and The Auto Sector
Mercosur was formed with the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion on November 29, 1991 by Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay5. The customs union became eﬀe c t i v eo nJ a n u a r y1 ,1 9 9 5
and the external tariﬀs converged progressively to an average rate of 14%6. Since then intra-bloc
trade has quadrupled which signiﬁcantly increased the share of Mercosur trade in member coun-
tries’ total trade volume (Table 1). Foreign Direct Investment has shown explosive growth during
the same period in Argentina and Brazil, with a substantial portion of these investments targeted
towards industries that beneﬁt from intra-bloc trade (see ECLAC [1998, 2000].)
Opinions on Mercosur’s impact are mixed. Yeats [1996] ﬁnds that intra-bloc trade has most
ﬂourished in those sectors with the highest protection (industrialized products) and the least re-
vealed comparative advantage. Olarreaga and Soloaga [1998] analyze the endogenous formation of
tariﬀs in Mercosur and show that Argentina and Brazil have the highest deviation from common
external tariﬀs and free internal trade in products for which they have high levels of protection.
The auto and sugar industries are the only sectors that have a uniﬁed sectoral agreement with
widespread exemptions from internal free trade and common external policies allowed by the GATT.
Argentina and Brazil are, for all practical purposes, the only countries that manufacture automobiles
in Mercosur7. Before Mercosur, both countries extended generous subsidies and granted high
protection to their respective industries with a mix of quotas and high tariﬀs as a part of their import
substitution schemes8. The majority of the companies were joint ventures of foreign multinationals
with domestic ﬁrms9. Prior to the signing of the Asuncion Treaty, the Argentine auto industry
5Bolivia and Chile became “associate members” in 1996. Full members form a custom union whereas the associate
members have a free trade agreement.
6Olarreaga and Soloaga [1998] analyze the stylized facts of the sectors being exempted. For in depth analysis of
trade liberalization in Argentina and Brazil see Cavallo and Cottani [1991] and Coes [1991].
7For an in-depth review of the Argentine automobile industry, see Nofal [1989]. Brazil’s history is well summarized
in Arbix and Rodrigues [1998].
8One of the arguments in favor of protectionism was to ease the balance of payments problems. For example, in
1995, Brazil imposed a unilateral quota on imported cars to ease the eﬀects of the Tequila crisis.
9Ford, Volkswagen, Fiat and General Motors were the main auto manufacturers in Brazil while Ford, Volkswagen,
5was in a severe crisis, with production at historically low levels of 100,000 units in 1990 (Table 2).
Mercosur led to a remarkable turnaround and the industry quadrupled its production to 409,000
units in 1994 and to 435,000 units in 1998. The Brazilian auto industry also showed solid growth,
roughly doubling its production during the decade (Table 2).
The signing of Mercosur had a big impact on the export levels of the Argentine auto industry
(Table 2). Before the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion, exports constituted 1% of total production.
Eight years later, in 1998, Argentina exported 237,497 units, accounting for 55% of production.
Brazil, on the other hand, doubled its production while the exports to production ratio stayed the
same.
The intra-industry trade between the two countries reveals even more impressive numbers.
Argentine auto exports rose from only $53 million to $2.6 billion in eight years (Table 3). Around
90% of this volume is headed for Brazil and it is around 30% of total merchandise exports to Brazil
(from 4% in 1990). In 1998, auto exports to Brazil accounted for almost 50% of total production
in Argentina from 3% in 1991 (Table 3). Brazilian exports to Argentina increased from $60 million
in 1990 to $2.0 billion in 1998 which is also around 30% of total exports (Table 4). Brazilian
export markets are relatively more diversiﬁed, with Argentina accounting for around 50% of total
exports and 14% of total production (Table 4). However, there has not been a signiﬁcant increase
in the total export volume and export/production ratio in Brazil. This implies that Brazilian
manufacturers switched to exporting to Argentina in lieu of other countries.
We have mentioned above that the auto industry receives the largest amount of FDI in the trade
bloc (CEI 1998). Table 5 shows the investment patterns for both countries. There is a tremendous
increase in investment in Brazil in particular. Argentina has also received remarkable investment
ﬂows, rivaled only by the food industry.
When two countries sign an RTA for an industry characterized by economies of scale and product
variety, trade gets diverted from third countries to the regional partner. Each country specializes
i nc e r t a i nv a r i e t i e sa n di m p o r t st h eo t h e r sa si nH e l p m a na n dK r u g m a n[ 1 9 8 6 ] . H o w e v e rt h i s
outcome requires symmetry between the two countries in many respects (especially in a partial-
equilibrium setting). In reality, Brazil enjoys larger economies of scale, lower labor, raw materials
and transportation costs and is therefore likely to produce all of the automobiles. This implies
no further production is expected to take place in Argentina after Mercosur, let alone production
and export booms as we actually observed. The sectoral agreement in automobiles and the CTC
Fiat,Renault and Peugeot were operating in Argentina. See Kosacoﬀ [1999] for more details.
6explain why Argentine auto industry was revitalized after Mercosur, why the intra-industry trade
grew so rapidly and why foreign ﬁrms invested so intensively in Argentina.
2.1 The Sectoral Agreement
GATT rules permit the exclusion of certain sectors from being liberalized under a preferential trade
agreement for a “reasonable period of time”. Protocol 21 of the Treaty of Asuncion provides for the
exclusion of auto and sugar sectors from free intra-bloc trade. One of the most important points
of Protocol 21 was the establishment of the so-called “compensated trade clause (CTC).” It allows
foreign ﬁrms that have plants in both countries to trade automobiles tariﬀ f r e e ,a sl o n ga st h e
trade between the two plants is “compensated.” More speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm is allowed to export US$1
from Brazil to Argentina, as long as it exports US$1.2 from its Argentine subsidiary to Brazil10.
Otherwise, regular tariﬀsh a v et ob ep a i d .T h eO u r oP r e t oP r o t o c o l ,s i g n e di nD e c e m b e ro f1 9 9 4
on the eve of the inauguration of the Customs Union, modiﬁed Protocol 21 by eliminating certain
quotas but kept the CTC in eﬀect. Finally, the Ouro Preto Protocol called for the implementation
of a ﬁnal auto agreement that would be in eﬀect on January 1, 2000. The Ouro Preto Protocol
was followed by a frenzy of investment announcements in both countries. A careful review of the
announcements and investment decisions show that the ﬁrms were investing in both countries by
generally building the more expensive models in Argentina.
The views expressed by people involved in the process reﬂect the importance of the CTC. The
former president of Ford Argentina stated in a newspaper in 1995: “This is not about trade, it is
about investments.” The Industry Secretary of Argentina at the time, Alieto Guadagni, went as
far as to say: “Without the Automobile Agreement, the Argentine car industry will disappear.”
The main lobby groups representing the auto manufacturers are ADEFA11 in Argentina and
ANFAVEA12 in Brazil. They have almost the same member ﬁrms whose representatives sit on
the boards of directors of both lobby groups. This fact provided the conduit through which ﬁrms
could lobby both the Argentine and Brazilian governments more eﬀectively. In fact, the two lobby
groups made a joint proposal to the national governments for the ﬁnal car agreement in June 1999.
The Ouro Preto Protocol had called for a ﬁnal agreement between the two nations to be reached
10Additionally, Protocol 21 imposed trade quotas of 18,000 units in 1991, 25,000 units in 1992 and 1993, and 40,000
units in 1994.
11ADEFA= Asociacion de Fabricantes de Automotores. This is the Argentine auto industry lobby group.
12ANFAVEA is the Brazilian auto industry lobby group.
7before the new millennium. The agreement between ADEFA and ANFAVEA gave Argentina the
assurance that the Brazilians would still agree to the compensated trade clause.
The ﬁn a ld o c u m e n tt h a tk e p tt h eC T Ci ne ﬀect until 2006 was signed on March 24, 2000. The
main reason for choosing this expiration date is the WTO rules which only allows a transitory period
for sectoral exceptions to the free trade between customs unions members. The governments oﬃcials
from both countries and the representatives from lobby groups spent considerable time and eﬀort
in Geneva to convince the WTO members not to ﬁle complaints against the new auto agreement in
Mercosur13. The most salient points of “Politica Automotriz del Mercosur”14(PAM) are as follows:
1. The compensation scheme is maintained with slight modiﬁcations. Firms are able to deviate
from the compensated trade requirement by 6.2% in 2000, 10.5% in 2001, 16.2% in 2002 and
22.2% in 2003. The “Automobile Commission” will revise the rules for the last three years of
the accord. Free trade between countries is set to start on January 1, 2006.
2. The “Automobile Commission” is formed to enforce the agreement. It is composed of members
from the auto industry and the governments. Its most important functions are to regulate
the compensation mechanisms of the accord. Speciﬁcally, it determines if the compensation
mechanism and the CTC are still necessary in the last three years of the accord.
3. A punishment mechanism is established for ﬁrms that deviate from the compensated trade
clause. For ﬁnished cars, the ﬁne is 70% of the external tariﬀs and for auto-parts is 75% of
tariﬀs.
4. The Common External Tariﬀ (CET) is to progressively increase to 35% in 2005 for ﬁnished
cars, the maximum permissible under WTO rules. This implies an increase in the tariﬀ rates
for Argentina, currently set in a range from 18% to 25%.
The PAM is not very diﬀerent from the pre-accord signed by ADEFA and ANFAVEA in 1999.
Representatives of the Argentine auto industry and the government were very satisﬁed, as reﬂected
by the comments made by several of the interested parties. Luis Ureta Sanchez, president of ADEFA
and Peugeot-Citroen of Argentina stated that “the accord is very similar to the one reached by
13Auto companies would naturally liked to have the PAM extended longer than 2006 but were happy to receive
this protection. As one of the auto lobby executives remarked, “who knows what will happen in 6 years? Maybe we
will be in NAFTA.” (New York Times, Nov.23, 3000)
14Mercosur ’s Automobile Policy
8ADEFA, ANFAVEA and the labor unions of Argentina and Brazil. Moreover, the six years of
duration is an excellent time frame to plan investment decisions,” (La Nacion 3/25/00). Similarly,
Enrique Federico, spokesperson of Mercedes-Benz Argentina, emphasizes the importance of the
auto industry for the future of Mercosur stating that “the compensated trade clause favors the
realization of investments in our country, since it permits the attenuation of variations in the
markets of the two countries. It guarantees local production of automobiles and the continuation
of our investments in the country.”(La Nacion 3/25/00 and Clarin 3/25/00)
All of the evidence indicates the economic and political importance of the auto sector for the
survival of Mercosur. The auto lobby groups and the two governments created an ingenious insti-
tution in the form of the CTC to prevent all of the auto manufacturing and the foreign investment
from migrating to Brazil under a free trade regime.
In the next sections, we present an analytical model that incorporates and analyzes the above
issues in more detail. The aim is to show the strategic problems that arise under a customs union
between asymmetric countries due to the signiﬁcance of the investment relocation eﬀects. Then,
the seemingly ineﬃcient CTC becomes an optimal mechanism to prevent the failure of socially
eﬃcient customs union agreements.
3 The Analytical Framework
3.1 Introduction
We use a game theoretic framework inﬂuenced by the Quid Pro Quo and political economy litera-
ture. The basic structure of this family of models is a simple two-stage perfect information game
played between interest groups and one government. In the ﬁrst stage, interest groups take an
action (such as oﬀering campaign contributions to the government) to inﬂuence the actions of the
government. In the second stage, the government chooses a policy variable (generally a tariﬀ)t o
maximize a “political” objective function, given the actions of the interest groups in the ﬁrst stage.
These models establish an explicit dependence between the behavior of domestic ﬁrms and the
degree of protection imposed by the government. In this paper, we use the investment decisions of
the foreign ﬁrms as strategic variables that inﬂuence the policy choices of the governments in the
second stage.
We present three separate games that are of increasing complexity. The ﬁrst game is a simple
9two-stage game between foreign ﬁrms and one government to determine tariﬀsa n di n v e s t m e n t
levels. It provides us the reservation payoﬀs used in subsequent games. In the ﬁrst stage, the
ﬁrms decide whether to produce in the foreign country and import to A or invest in A and produce
locally. In the second stage, the government of country A sets a tariﬀ t depending on the investment
decisions of the ﬁrms to maximize its objective function. Then production takes place and payoﬀs
are realized.
T h es e c o n dg a m ei sp l a y e db e t w e e nf o r e i g nﬁrms and the governments of two symmetric coun-
tries forming a Customs Union. In the ﬁrst stage, the governments meet to form a customs union.
In the second stage, foreign ﬁrms decide to produce in country A,c o u n t r yB or to import from
their own country. In the third stage, the two governments impose a common external tariﬀ taking
the investment decisions as given. If a customs union is not formed in the ﬁrst stage, the two
governments play their individual games with the ﬁr m sa si nt h eﬁrst game. Finally, production
and trade in the respective countries take place and payoﬀs are realized.
The third game is identical to the second game except that the countries are not symmetric.
More speciﬁcally, country B has a cost advantage in production over country A. In this case we
show that equilibrium outcome is quite diﬀerent from the one obtained in the second game.
3.2 Basic Model
There are three economic agents in this model: consumers, ﬁrms and governments. We begin by
considering two countries: country A and the foreign country f where the auto companies and their
plants are located (for example, the United States). The auto market in country A is composed
of M categories (such as minivans and compact cars) and there are N auto manufacturers who
produce one brand in each category. Brands in a given category are perfect substitutes and the
ﬁrms are identical in every respect.
Firms face two types of costs when producing their brand in a given category: the ﬁxed cost of
operating a plant (denoted by F)i nc o u n t r yA and variable cost of production. F includes man-
agerial and overhead costs at the plant level and does not include capital expenditure. The variable
cost arises from the following production technology for each category regardless of production
location:
x = g(K,L)=δKαL1−α
where x is the output, δ is a technology parameter K is the capital and L is the eﬀective labor
10employed. Assume r is the rental rate of capital which is same for the ﬁr m sr e g a r d l e s so fl o c a t i o n
while the wage rate w is country speciﬁc. This leads to the total cost function that is linear in





where ∆ is a function of α. Thus the marginal cost of production is constant and includes labor
and capital costs. A ﬁrm decides whether to produce in the foreign country at marginal cost cf
or in country A at marginal cost cA. We assume that the marginal cost of a unit in the foreign
country is lower than producing the same unit in country A for all ﬁrms so that cA >c f. Higher
eﬀective wages in A or diﬀerent technology parameters (due to diﬀerent infrastructure) might cause
this15.A l lﬁrms already have plants operating in the foreign country and the only relevant ﬁxed
cost is the one to operate a plant in country A. This implies that under free trade, we do not
see any investment and production by foreign ﬁrms in country A since it is cheaper to import
from the foreign country. Furthermore the capital employed is also a linear function of output:
K = x(β/δ)(w/r)
1−α. Therefore any policy that increases the production in A increases foreign
direct investment. For the rest of the paper, we use the phrases investment and local production
interchangeably.
The ﬁr m sf a c et h ef o l l o w i n gl i n e a rm a r k e td e m a n df u n c t i o ni ne a c hc a t e g o r ym16:
D(p)=a − p (1)
We assume that the N ﬁrms in a given category engage in Cournot competition. For the moment
assume that kA of these ﬁr m sh a v ep l a n t si nc o u n t r yA and the rest import the autos produced
in the plants located in the foreign country. Then the equilibrium quantity produced by a ﬁrm












where t is the tariﬀ imposed by the government A on the imported units. Similarly, each ﬁrm that










15None of the results in this section and the rest of the paper require the assumption c
A >c
f which is adopted
for simplicity. As it becomes more clear in the next section, government A uses the trade policy to encourage local
production by foreign ﬁrms. As long as the equilibrium number of ﬁrms investing and local production levels are
higher than their free-trade equivalents, our results hold. A high enough F for some ﬁrms guarantees this condition.
16We assume that the utility a consumer derives from consumption in one category is independent of the utility
derived from another category. This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis although the result do not depend on it.
11The total quantity consumed is










The proﬁt levels (ignoring the ﬁxed operational costs) for each ﬁrm from their operations in the


















CS(X)+t[N − k]xf + ΦkxA
l
(3)
The ﬁrst term of (3) is simply the consumer surplus in the category as in equation (2). The second
term is the tariﬀ revenue collected on the imported volume when N −k ﬁrms supply the domestic
market from their plants in the foreign country. The last term is the domestic production by k ﬁrms
in the category weighted by parameter Φ which is simply how much the government values domestic
production. The inclusion of the third term is justiﬁed by, among other factors, the employment
that production generates and the capital that is brought to a country since FDI is proportional to
the output. It also represents political economy motivations to please powerful labor unions who
greatly beneﬁt from increased manufacturing activity. A higher tariﬀ rate has two positive eﬀects
on this term: it increases the consumption of products manufactured at home and induces foreign
ﬁrms to produce more brands at home.
4 G a m e1-S i n g l eC o u n t r y
We are ready to consider the ﬁrst game between N auto companies and a single country. It is a
two-stage perfect information game where the ﬁrms face a choice between producing in the foreign
c o u n t r yo ri nc o u n t r yA in the ﬁrst stage. We assume that all ﬁrms announce their investment and
location decisions simultaneously. They face a marginal cost per variety equal to cf and a tariﬀ
12t (to be determined in the second stage) if they produce in the foreign country. They can also
produce in country A at a cost of cA and pay no tariﬀ. In the second stage, the government of
country A maximizes its welfare function and determines t. We use backward induction to solve for














2NkA + N +3 kA +2
(4)
The optimal tariﬀ tA is increasing in Φ, the weight attached to domestic production and decreasing
in kA,t h en u m b e ro fﬁrms which decide to invest17.
Firms decide to invest in A if the increase in proﬁts cover the ﬁxed cost F.I f kA − 1 ﬁrms
invest in country A, then the necessary condition for the kth ﬁrm to also invest is that the change







The proﬁtd i ﬀerence on the left hand side is decreasing in kA which means the marginal beneﬁt
from investing in A decreases as more ﬁrms invest there. The equilibrium number of ﬁrms investing
in A depends on the exogenous demand and supply parameters.




by expression (4). If t0 <c A − cf, there is no investment and local production by any ﬁrm since
condition (5) does not hold for any kA and for any value of F. On the other hand, if t0 >c A −cf,
then the ﬁrst ﬁrm might be able to increase its (variable) proﬁts by investing in country A.O f
course, the actual condition for investment is πA (1)−πf (0) >F. If this fails to hold, then there is
also no investment by any ﬁrm. If it is satisﬁed, then the ﬁrst ﬁrm invests. The second ﬁrm has less
incentive to invest since the proﬁtd i ﬀerence decreases with kA.I fπA (N) − πf (N − 1) >F,t h e n
all ﬁrms invest in A.I fw et r e a tkA as a continuous, rather than a discrete variable, the equilibrium
number of ﬁrms investing kA










In the following section, we use this equation to implicitly deﬁne the equilibrium number of ﬁrms
investing in A a n da s s u m et h a tt h e r ei sa ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n .
In the model we assume that the ﬁrms announce their investment decisions simultaneously. If
kA (where kA <k A
1 ) ﬁrms invest, then this can not be a Nash Equilibrium since one of the non-
investing ﬁrms can improve its payoﬀ by changing its decision. Similarly, one of the investing ﬁrms
17This condition holds for all values of k if Φ is large enough.
13can improve its payoﬀ if kA >k A
1 by shutting down its plant in A. A sequential announcement of
investment decisions or a dynamic adjustment process (in which a new ﬁrms invests as long as it






[N+2] <c A − cf,t h e nkA
1 =0
If [a−cf]
[N+2] >c A − cf,t h e nkA









We have previously stated that there are M categories in auto market. Suppose we rank the
categories according to the cost diﬀerential where cA
m − c
f
m is increasing in m.T h e s u b s c r i p t m
can be a measure of the luxury level of the category and the ranking implies that the extra cost of
producing a car in A increases with the luxury level. Then kA (m), t h en u m b e ro ff o r e i g nc o m p a n i e s
investing in A, is decreasing in m. In other words, there are fewer companies operating plants in
country A and more companies prefer to import from the foreign country as the automobiles become
more luxurious and the foreign country has a larger cost advantage. Also, in equilibrium, there are
more ﬁrms investing in categories with low cost diﬀerentials (cA
m −c
f
m)i nc o u n t r yA. Furthermore,
the equilibrium tariﬀs are increasing in the cost diﬀerential (for a given level of kA)a n di nt h el e v e l
of investment kA (for a given cost diﬀerential cA
m−c
f
m) which implies that the tariﬀs are increasing
in the category index m. That is, the tariﬀ rate is higher for more luxurious models as a result of
these two eﬀects.
5 Game 2 - Customs Union Negotiations Between Symmetric
Countries
We now introduce the scenario which is relevant for the analysis of the Mercosur negotiations.
Our aim is to show how the game between a government and the foreign ﬁrms changes when the
government is also involved in customs union negotiations with a second country. More speciﬁcally,
the decision to form a customs union depends on its impact on the investment decisions of the
ﬁrms.
In this game, we again have N identical ﬁrms as in the previous game and two symmetric
countries, A and B. We add a new initial stage in which the two governments decide whether to
form a customs union or not. The political costs of forming a customs union dictate that it cannot
be dissolved once formed. If a customs union is formed, all ﬁrms simultaneously announce their
plant location decisions (in A, B or f) in the second stage. After observing the decisions of the
14ﬁrms, the two governments negotiate a common external tariﬀ tCU in the third stage. Then, the
production takes place and payoﬀs are realized.
If the two governments do not form a customs union in the ﬁrst stage, we end up with two
separate single country games as in the previous section. Firms decide on their plant locations
and then the governments impose the unilaterally optimal tariﬀs (denoted tA and tB)a sg i v e nb y
expression (4).
The formation of the customs union has an important impact on the production and investment
decisions of the ﬁrms. We again assume that the ﬁrms already have plants in country f which do
not need additional expenditure whereas the plants in A or B require an identical ﬁxed operational
cost of F. The marginal cost of production is lower in f compared to A or B (which we assume
are identical in this section) so that cA = cB >c f.T h e ﬁrms beneﬁt strongly from the customs
union agreement (assuming the tariﬀs stayed the same) since they can supply the markets of both
countries from one plant and do not have to replicate the ﬁxed cost F. If a customs union is not
established, all the imports of A come from f since B has higher production costs and the same
tariﬀ rate is imposed on the imported goods regardless of production location.
We use backward induction starting with the last stage to ﬁnd the equilibrium of this game.
Suppose there are kA
2 (kB
2 )plants in country A (B)a n dl e txA (xB) denote the production of a
plant located in A (B)t h a ti sc o n s u m e di nA while xf represents the imported car sales in one
country. These are given by the following:
xA =
a − [N +1 ]cA + kA











a − [N +1 ]cB + kA


























The total consumption in A is
XA =
Na− kA


























The ﬁrst expression is the consumer surplus, the second expression is the tariﬀ collected on the
imports consumed in A and the third expression is the total production from the plants in A for
15consumption in both countries18. The payoﬀ function for B is similarly deﬁned. We assume that
the common external tariﬀ is given by the solution to the following Nash bargaining game:













This tariﬀ rate is eﬃcient in the sense that there are no further Pareto gains possible19.T h eﬁrst
order condition from this expression provides the equilibrium for the Nash bargaining game. Before
solving the optimum tariﬀ explicitly, we make several observations. A simple comparative static
exercise reveals that the common external tariﬀ rate is increasing as a given number of plants are





The ﬁrms decide whether to invest or not and where to locate their plants. The decision to
invest is made if the increase in proﬁts compensates for the operational ﬁxed cost. Since the ﬁrms
can serve two markets with one plant, the appropriate measure is the total proﬁt from the region.




































is decreasing in tCU. Since the tariﬀ rate is declining in the disparity between the




  ), the lowest tariﬀ rate (for a ﬁxed kA
c +kB
c )
and the highest payoﬀsf o rﬁrms are reached when kA
2 = kB
2 .I fw eh a v ekA
2 <k B
2 ,t h e nﬁrms have
the incentive to relocate their plants from B to A since it leads to lower tariﬀs and higher payoﬀs.
Thus, in equilibrium, we see equal levels of investment in both countries. This observation enables
us to easily calculate the equilibrium common external tariﬀ:
tCU =
a − [Nk2 +2 k2 +1 ]cf +[ Nk2 +2 k2]cA +[ Nk2 + k2]Φ
2Nk2 + N +3 k2 +2
This is the identical tariﬀ function we obtained in the previous section where k2 = kA
2 + kB
2 is the
total number of plants in A and B. Therefore the customs union implements the same tariﬀ rate
as the individual countries if the number of plants serving a market is the same.
18Since the countries are identical, the demand for a given company’s plant is also identical in both countries
regardless of where the plant is located. So the total production of a plant located in A is 2x
A.
19It is important to note that we assume that there are no direct transfers possible between the two governments.
The presence of transfers has strong implications, especially in the next section of the paper.
16The next issue is the equilibrium number of ﬁrms operating plants in the customs union area.













F.S i n c eπA (k2) − πf (k2) is declining in k2,w eh a v ek2 >k A
1 .
The customs union agreement is successfully signed in stage 1 if governments know that the




















Again, a simple comparative statics exercise shows that both governments are better oﬀ under the
customs union. The consumer surplus increases since the prices go down. The eﬀect on the total
tariﬀ revenue is ambiguous but the increase in consumer surplus more than compensates the loss.
Finally, the payoﬀ from domestic production increases since more ﬁrms invest in the region and
produce at higher levels.
We now summarize the results of this section:
Summary 1 When two symmetric countries form a customs union, (i) more ﬁrms invest in the
region k2 >k A
1 = kB
1 , (ii) the investments are equally divided between the two countries kA
2 = kB
2 ,
(iii) total capital invested and production in the region increases, and (iv) the equilibrium tariﬀ rate
increases tCU >t A compared to the outcome of a unilateral game.
It is important to recognize the strategic linkages between the investment (and domestic pro-
duction) decisions and the customs union negotiations. Among the strongest supporters of a trade
agreement are the potential export sectors since their production levels and proﬁts increase. Fur-
thermore, trade liberalization between two countries and an increase in the external tariﬀ rate lead
to higher regional production because each ﬁrms can serve a larger market from a single plant.
Since the capital employed is proportional to the output, increase in the production level causes an
increase in the FDI into the region. It is important to emphasize that this investment expansion
eﬀect refers to the increase in the capital employed by foreign ﬁrms to maintain higher production
levels, not necessarily to the number of plants in operation in a country20, (although this also occurs
in equilibrium.) It also does not refer to the level of ﬁxed operating costs F incurred by ﬁrms.
T h ed e s i r et oa t t r a c tm o r ef o r e i g nc a p i t a la n dp r o d u c t i o ni n t ot h er e g i o np r o v i d e so n eo ft h e
strongest motives for the formation of regional trade agreements in recent years. As Argentina’s
20Government A would naturally prefer a single plant producing 100,000 units to two plants producing 10,000 units
each. The former requires higher level of FDI and employs more workers.
17Secretary of Industry had declared, the long and tedious negotiations about automobiles were not
about the trade, but about foreign investments in auto production.
This is almost exactly what happened in Mercosur. There was barely any trade in automobiles
between Argentina and Brazil before Mercosur since their products faced the same external tariﬀs
as the products from other countries without any favorable treatment. All imports into either
country came from lower cost and higher quality producers such as Europe and the United States.
The formation of Mercosur changed the landscape since intra-Mercosur products receive positive
discrimination compared to third countries’ products. The result was a trade boom between the
countries, which jumped to a total of US$4.7 billion in 1998 from only US$110 million in 1990. Also,
the investment levels of foreign companies increased considerably after Mercosur. In Argentina,
Fiat and Renault bought out their domestic partners and enlarged their production capacities. Ford
and Volkswagen ended their partnership to establish their own operations. Chrysler, GM, Toyota
announced that they are going to enter the market. In Brazil, the existing ﬁrms, Volkswagen, Fiat,
Ford and GM increased their production capacities while Renault and several Japanese companies
announced new investments. During the last ﬁve years more than 30% of total foreign investment
into Mercosur was for auto production which fueled the rapid increase in the production levels.
6 Game 3 - Asymmetric Countries
The strategic interaction between the foreign ﬁrms and the two governments does not fully capture
the trade and investment environment in the auto industry of Mercosur in one important respect:
the production cost asymmetry between Argentina and Brazil. In this section, we modify the
game to incorporate this asymmetry and to analyze its economic and strategic signiﬁcance. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that cA >c B rather than cA = cB. This seemingly innocuous change
has important implications on the equilibrium outcome although everything else with respect to
market structure, ﬁxed costs and the timing of the events stays the same as before. First, the two
governments negotiate to form an irreversible customs union. If an agreement is reached, the ﬁrms
decide to invest and where to locate their plants. Next the governments play a Nash bargaining
game to determine the common external tariﬀ rate. Finally, the production takes place and payoﬀs
are realized. If the two governments cannot agree on a customs union, each government plays the
unilateral game independently with the ﬁrms. We again solve the game starting from the last stage:
We let kA
3 and kB
3 denote the number of plants in A and B respectively announced in stage 2.
18Then the sales level of a representative ﬁrm in a single country (A or B)i fi t sp l a n ti si nA is given
by
xA =
a − [N +1 ]cA + kA










while the single-country sales if the plant is in B is equal to
xB =
a − [N +1 ]cB + kA










Similarly, the imports in a single country of a representative ﬁrm is
xf =















The equilibrium common external tariﬀ r a t ei sa g a i ng i v e nb yt h es o l u t i o no ft h eN a s hb a r g a i n i n g
game played between the two governments:












UA and UB are the objective function deﬁned in (7). The ﬁrms base their investment decisions on
their potential impact on the tariﬀ level and the proﬁt levels from the two markets. Both the tariﬀ






















We observe that πA < πB for all levels of t if

cA − cB
is large enough. In the previous section,
the tariﬀ rate increased with the diﬀerence between kA and kB in the presence of symmetric costs.
Since the proﬁt level is decreasing in the tariﬀ rate, the ﬁrms choose to allocate their locations
equally between the two countries. However, the direct eﬀect of production cost savings dominates
this indirect eﬀect when the cost diﬀerence

cA − cB
is large enough. Therefore, once the customs
union is formed, all ﬁrms locate their plants in B in order to take advantage of lower production
costs and serve both markets from this plant21. The proﬁtd i ﬀerence between investing and not













3 from this equation since it is equal to zero in equilibrium. More foreign ﬁrms
invest once the customs union is established so that kB
3 >k B
1 . Furthermore, the total production






1 . This is the investment expansion
21See Corden (1972) for a theoretical exposition.
19eﬀect of customs union formation and it is still positive even if the countries are asymmetric. The
investment relocation eﬀect presents itself through the closing of all plants in A (that were present
before the CU) and migration of all production to B after the CU. In other words, the number of
plants in A drops from kA
1 to kA
3 under customs union.
Customs union is formed if both countries are better oﬀ compared to the outcomes from uni-
lateral games. Suppose kB
3 and tCU are the equilibrium number of ﬁrms investing and the tariﬀ
rate established under a customs union if the governments agree to it in the ﬁrst stage. Country





















N+1 is the total quantity consumed in A.W e n e e d t o s e e i f A
c a no b t a i nah i g h e rp a y o ﬀ by leaving the customs union and choosing a unilateral tariﬀ.S u p p o s e






cB − cf − tCU

+ tCU (11)
unilaterally on all imports regardless of the origin. Then all of the consumption in A comes from
f since it is cheaper for all ﬁrms to supply the demand in A from plants in f.H o w e v e r ,t h et o t a l
consumption and therefore, the consumer surplus stay the same. Under the new scheme, the tariﬀ
revenue is t∗Nx∗ where x∗ = a−cf−t∗
N+1 >x
f
3. When we substitute t∗ from expression (11) into the









larger than the tariﬀ revenue under the customs union. This implies A is able to choose a unilateral
non-discriminatory tariﬀ rate that keeps the consumer surplus unchanged while increasing the tariﬀ
r e v e n u ea n dt h et o t a lp a y o ﬀ. Since this is not even the optimal policy in the unilateral game, the
customs union can never lead to a higher payoﬀ for A compared to the unilateral outcome. Thus
A never agrees to the customs union.
We now summarize the equilibrium under the customs union:
Summary 2 If the asymmetry between two countries (cA − cB) is large enough, (i) all foreign
ﬁrms invest in B under the customs union kB
3 >k A




1 and (iii) total capital invested and production in the region increases. However, in
the absence of any direct compensation from B,c o u n t r yA is worse oﬀ and does not agree to the
customs union in the ﬁrst stage.
20The asymmetry between the countries shifts all investment and production to B and this causes
the payoﬀ for A to go below its unilateral payoﬀ. Another important result of the paper is that the
investment relocation eﬀect of a customs union dominates its investment expansion eﬀect for A.
This leads to the collapse of the customs union. The governments can solve this problem if direct
transfers were available so that B could compensate A for its loss.
The CTC enters the picture to solve this problem since it operates as an indirect transfer
mechanism. In essence the CTC requires all ﬁrms to balance their trades between the two countries
although the actual rules are a little more complicated. Firms need to invest and produce in both
countries if they want to sell their products with no tariﬀs in the other country. If the output of
the plants in B cannot be sold in A, the beneﬁts of the customs union for the ﬁrms disappear and
investment expansion does not take place. We assume that this clause is a part of the customs
union agreement signed in the ﬁrst stage.
This is where diﬀerent categories of automobiles become important. For simplicity, we suppose
that there are two categories. We let i (j) denote the basic (luxury) category so that ci <c j
regardless of the production location. We also assume that the cost savings from producing i in B






We loosely interpret the CTC in this context as the requirement that each ﬁrm has to have one
plant in each country. Under these circumstances, all ﬁrms choose to produce i in B and j in A.
Suppose this was not the case and ﬁrm ZZZ located its plant for i in A and for j in B. Assuming
the number of j plants in A and i plants in B are high enough, switching the location of these two
plants of ﬁrm ZZZ has no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the tariﬀ rate in either category or the sales of other







































because of the cost parameters. Firm
ZZZ beneﬁts from switching its production locations and so do all other ﬁrms. Thus, if the ﬁxed
cost F is high enough for all models, all ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to take advantage of the CTC rule
and serve both markets from a single plant. Firms locate all plants for j (i)i nA (B) in equilibrium.
This rule eliminates the investment relocation eﬀect of the customs union while maintaining the
investment expansion eﬀect. We now summarize the results:
21Summary 3 Suppose a customs union is formed between two asymmetric countries under the









too large. Then, (i) all luxury (basic) cars are produced in the higher (lower) cost country, (ii) more
ﬁrms invest in the region and (iii) more production takes place in the region. Both governments
are better oﬀ and thus agree to the customs union.
As the Argentine Secretary of Industry declared, without a compensated trade clause there
would be no more cars produced in Argentina under Mercosur. Furthermore, it was implicitly
understood that there would be no Mercosur without this rule! Another conﬁrmation about the
importance of balanced investments comes from the auto lobby who has the most to gain from
a customs union agreement. Perhaps the most vocal proponent for a compensated trade clause,
former ADEFA president Horacio Losoviz wrote, “To produce or To Import, that is the question.
We need to grow with Brazil, maintain the proportion of investment and production and the
specialization in brands and types of vehicles” in the newsletter “Siglo XXI” (May 1999).
The compensated trade clause has another signiﬁcant beneﬁt for the auto companies other than
solving the free rider problem. Before Mercosur, the main auto manufacturers in Argentina were
the local subsidiaries of same multinational ﬁrms22. In other words, the companies who were to
greatly beneﬁt from Mercosur, who worked hard to save the sectoral agreement and who came
up with the compensated trade clause had already existing plants in both countries. Their costs
of enlarging their plant capacities are much lower than new entrants. If Mercosur is successfully
established, then new ﬁrms only invest in Brazil. This has two negative consequences for the
existing ﬁrms. First, it gives new ﬁrms an advantage over older ﬁrms since they have lower costs
and second, it puts the future of Mercosur in danger if Brazilian production and exports were to
eventually dominate the joint market. Thu, the existing ﬁrms were strongly in favor of such a rule
since it provides higher entry costs for new ﬁrms (which need to operate some plants in Argentina)
and guarantees the future of Mercosur.
It is a signal of the strength of the auto lobby in both countries that their members jointly formed
the Automobile Commission to enforce the compensated trade clause. It has the authority to rule
on the allowed exceptions from the compensation rule. The structure and rules of the commission
make it sound like a cartel arrangement that would protect its market from new entries. The net
eﬀects of the commission are likely to become more apparent in the coming years and be the subject
of another study.
22The only exception was GM who had no operations in Argentina at the time.
227C o n c l u s i o n
Our aim is to study the signiﬁcant eﬀects of the formation of customs unions on production location
decisions of multinationals and FDI ﬂows. Since a larger market can be served from a single plant
and ﬁxed operational costs can be lowered, total foreign investment and production (which the
governments value) are likely to increase. We refer to this as the investment expansion eﬀect. At
the same time, some of the original investment and production is likely to be diverted to the lower-
cost countries from higher-cost ones within the customs union. This investment relocation eﬀect
decreases the incentives for higher-cost countries to sign a customs union agreement.
We have provided an extensive discussion of the auto industry in Mercosur and of the sectoral
agreements that govern this sector in the trade bloc as a case study of the above phenomenon.
The most important impact of Mercosur on the auto sector is the growth in the FDI ﬂowing into
the region. This capital is used to build new plants (or to enlarge existing ones) to increase local
production. Since Brazil has lower costs, it is economically eﬃcient for foreign ﬁrms to establish
their plants there in order to serve both markets. However, this prevents Argentina from agreeing to
a customs union in the ﬁrst place. Therefore it is necessary to direct some of the foreign investment
to Argentina in the absence of direct compensation mechanisms. This creates a collective action
problem among the auto ﬁrms since each one prefers to invest in Brazil. To solve this problem
and to promote investments into Argentina, the auto companies themselves lobbied in favor of
the compensated trade clause forcing all ﬁr m st oe s t a b l i s hp l a n t si nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .F u r t h e r m o r e ,
this rule beneﬁts the incumbent ﬁrms at the expense of new entrants since it increases the cost of
entry while sending a signal to the Argentine government that auto production and investment will
continue. We concluded that, although it is economically ineﬃcient, the compensated trade clause
is strategically necessary for the establishment of free trade in automobiles and realization of the
beneﬁts from it for all parties.
There are many areas for future research on both the empirical and theoretical fronts. On the
empirical front, further disaggregation of the data will permit an in-depth analysis of the trade
ﬂows in the sector at 4-digit SITC level. The extensive data-set collected can be used for an
empirical estimation of trade relocation and/or suppression in the sector. On the theoretical front,
the next topic is to analyze the model when a FDI-recipient country forms a customs union with
the FDI-donor country such as Mexico and the United States in NAFTA.
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26Table 1 - Mercosur Trade Performance




























Note: Intra-Bloc Trade is in US$ millions
Source: DOTS















































Note: The ﬁrst two columns are in units.
Source: ADEFA, ANFAVEA

















( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
88 36 7.69 40.89 16.30
107 37 5.05 34.52 13.66
117 36 6.39 30.76 17.66
137 35 4.97 25.48 12.42
184 57 4.65 30.86 20.33
162 53 3.83 32.66 24.31
240 112 6.99 46.49 37.95 2.83
448 217 12.58 48.42 44.00 5.02
744 503 18.53 67.35 36.92 7.05
947 693 18.93 73.13 31.70 7.74
1,339 1,097 19.62 81.94 35.03 12.20
1,647 1,458 21.49 88.54 37.31 31.73
2,882 2,538 31.29 88.07 39.77 38.30
2,917 2,634 32.82 90.29 na 50.46
Sources: ADEFA, ANFAVEA, NBER, WTA
(1) Total Industry Exports, US$ Millions
(2) Industry Exports to Brazil, US$ Millions
(3) Auto Industry Exports to Brazil / Total Exports to Brazil (%)
(4) Auto Industry Exports to Brazil / Total Industry Exports (%)
(5) Auto Industry Imports from Brazil / Total Industry Imports (%)
(6) Exports To Brazil/ Total Production (%)

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1,581 37 6.87 2.34 12.77
1,477 44 6.54 2.98 6.88
2,441 63 7.61 2.58 6.26
2,551 25 2.62 0.98 7.03
2,545 42 5.90 1.65 10.10
1,892 60 9.33 3.17 7.94
1,910 259 17.59 13.56 14.24
3,010 913 30.05 30.33 20.81
2,658 897 24.54 33.75 24.30
2,684 1,041 25.18 38.78 18.78 16.87
2,417 812 20.10 33.63 16.88 9.79
3,012 1,279 24.74 42.47 30.68 11.02
3,964 1,935 28.60 49.26 39.85 11.76
4,263 2,042 30.27 47.90 na 13.91
Sources: ADEFA, ANFAVEA, NBER, WTA
(1) Total Industry Exports, US$ Millions,
(2) Industry Exports to Argentina, US$ Millions
(3) Industry Exports to Argentina / Total Exports to Argentina (%)
(4) Industry Exports to Argentina/ Total Industry Exports (%)
(5) Industry Imports from Argentina / Total Industry Imports (%)
(6) Exports to Argentina / Production (%)
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